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T HE INDELIBLE image of firefighters raising the American
flag amidst the rubble and destruction of the September 11,
2001 attacks has as much symbolic value as it does emotional
impact. The flag stood as a testament to the human spirit,
American patriotism, and the hope that good will eventually
prevail over evil. In a time when nothing seemed certain and
terror, violence, and war seemed inevitable, the flag stood as a
statement that Americans would stand their ground and fight to
defend their homeland. Although the last bulldozer has left
"ground zero," citizens and the Government are still trying to
reconstruct their shattered sense of national security. The new
legislative framework that is emerging strongly reflects an emo-
tionally charged stand-and-fight mentality. Nowhere is this phi-
losophy more evident than in the provision to equip commercial
airline pilots with firearms.
Immediately following the attacks, the Bush Administration
announced its new-fangled and unyielding commitment to a
"war on terrorism" and launched a series of legislative bills that
focused on national defense and preventive measures. The first
phase of the campaign was most apparent abroad as troops ar-
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rived in Afghanistan, chased out the Taliban, and went cave by
cave in search of Osama bin Laden. At home, however, Ameri-
cans may not have realized that their own political landscape
was changing almost as drastically as that of their Afghan
counterparts.
Although politicians shared a palpable sense of the need to
respond aggressively to the attacks, there was less accord on the
methods by which the country should react. Starting at the
source of the tragedy, it was clear that commercial aviation had
been redefined from a target of terrorism to a weapon itself, and
the Government would have to shift its policy to reflect the
changing threat. A critical look at commercial airline and air-
port security revealed the abundant failures in procedure, tech-
nology, and personnel that allowed a small group of men with
box cutters to devastate an entire country.
The first call to arm pilots came from Congress in November
2001, but when given the choice, lawmakers refused to answer
the call. Despite its lack of initial legislative force, the proposal
had an enormous impact by launching a year-long debate be-
tween self-proclaimed gun-toting patriots and concerned oppo-
sition including the Bush Administration, airlines, airline crews,
and passengers. Intense lobbying by pilots' unions and groups
such as the National Rifle Association (NRA) led large majori-
ties of the House and Senate to the pass two similar bills aimed
at arming pilots. The Senate bill was part of the larger Home-
land Security Act, which President Bush signed into law on No-
vember 25, 2002.
Gun lobbyists and many pilots' associations have pushed hard
for the right to allow pilots to carry guns for they worry that the
lack of manpower and lag time associated with organizing and
training air marshals will result in a crucial chink in the armor
of air safety and national defense. They believe pilots must have
a way to protect themselves and their passengers and prevent
their planes from being used as weapons of mass destruction.
Opponents of the bill cite multiple complications with the im-
plementation of the program and its maintenance. There are
important safety concerns and unanswered questions including
the effects of a stray bullet on the stability of the aircraft. Chal-
lengers to the bill worry about pilot error, unpredictability, and
misjudgment. Legal scholars have raised eyebrows over liability
issues and the immunity that the bill provides for airlines and
pilots. Economists question the source of funding. Most impor-
tantly, passengers have wondered if it is really the job of a com-
860
ARMING PILOTS WITH HANDGUNS
mercial airline pilot to carry a deadly weapon onto a plane and
be able to fire at will.
This paper examines the issues surrounding arming pilots
and ultimately argues that it should not be part of America's
defense against domestic terrorism. Like sticking a flag into the
ground, sticking a gun into the hands of a pilot is a reaction to
feelings of vulnerability and helplessness, and it satisfies a child-
like need for comfort and security. While these feelings are a
natural response to an event like September 11th, politics is not
the arena in which they should be addressed, and legislation
should not be used as a national pacifier. Taking an active
stance against terrorism does not justify a codified transgression
of ethics, nor does it mean abandoning civilized principles.
The reality of guns on planes is that they generate more dan-
ger and risk than benefits by creating a potentially deadly situa-
tion each time a gun is carried in the airport or onboard a
plane. Although a pilot will rarely come face to face with a ter-
rorist, guns will be a constant presence on flights everyday. If
the uncertainty of human reaction to, individual judgment of,
or fatigued pilots' perceptions of day-to-day flight emergencies
does not cast a dark enough shadow on the idea, consider the
unintended consequences that could result from a high-pres-
sure terrorist hijacking. Copious problems exist with the opera-
tional details of the armament program as well. This paper
briefly looks at the terrorism that serves as a catalyst for arming
pilots, for it is important to understand the threat to which the
Government is responding. Next, it explores the specific provi-
sions of the House and Senate bills, including the Homeland
Security Act that is now law, under the rubric of strategy and
safety, cost, liability, policy, and ethics. It suggests a different
hierarchy of safety priorities and equally effective non-lethal
alternatives.
II. THE CHANGING THREAT OF TERROR AND THE
ROLE OF AVIATION
The danger of terrorist activity on commercial airlines has
been a reality since the early 1930s. 1 In the subsequent decades,
See Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II & Colonel John R. Martin, Terrorism Viewed
Historically, Defeating Terrorism: Strategic Issues Analyses (Jan. 2002), at http://
www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2002/terror/terror.pdf; see also STEP1-EN E. AT-
KINS, TERRORISM 33-65 (1992) (listing a chronology of terrorist events from 1894
to 1992); see generally, PETER ST. JOHN, AIR PIRACY, AIRPORT SECURITY AND INTERNA-
2003] 861
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
the domestic threat to aviation most commonly came in the
form of foreign hijackers2 who seized passenger jets and traded
the hostages on board for money, prisoner release, a new desti-
nation, or most often, a chance to broadcast their political and
underlying religious beliefs.' The hostage planes merely served
as a stage upon which the terrorists ran their show.4 They either
chose to remain in the air until officials met their demands or
landed the plane and sat on the runway, sometimes for weeks,
until negotiators, desperate to avoid confrontation and loss of
life, complied with their terms. Despite negotiators' best efforts
to avoid violence or loss of life, several hijackings ended with
both terrorists and innocent hostages dying. For the most part,
though, passengers and crew members learned that if they re-
mained quiet, stayed calm, and did what the hijackers in-
structed, they would eventually be released. On September 11,
2001, however, the mundane pattern and resulting complacency
were shattered.
The attacks on the World Trade Center revealed a new breed
of terrorists who did not fit the pattern and were not interested
in negotiating. The September 11th attackers capitalized on the
value of a domestic jumbo jet full of Americans, not as a bargain-
ing chip, but "as a symbol, the destruction of which demon-
strated Western vulnerability and [the terrorists'] skill in
bringing attention to their cause and adulation from their con-
stituencies."5 They were not following the pattern of using ter-
rorism "as a means to an end" but using it as "an end unto
itself."6 No political messages were announced nor demands
made; they wanted to demoralize Americans, cause widespread
panic, and underscore America's culpability.7 The perpetrators,
members of the Al Qaeda network led by Osama bin Laden,
TIONAL TERRORISM: WINNING THE WAR AGAINST HIJACKERS (1991) (discussing his-
torical evolution of airplane hijacking).
2 STEPHEN E. ATKINS, TERRORISM 67-86 (1992) (providing biographical profiles
of leading terrorists).
3 Phillip A. Karber, Re-Constructing Global Aviation in an Era of the Civil Aircraft as
a Weapon of Destruction, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 781, 785 (2002).
4 See William Regis Farrell, The U.S. Government Response to Terrorism: In Search of
an Effective Strategy, 6 Westview Press (1982) (discussing terrorism as "theater").
5 Karber, supra note 3, at 786.
6 See Farrell, supra note 4.
7 Id. at 10.
8 See generally Dr. Stephen Biddle, War Aims and War Termination, Defeating
Terrorism: Strategic Issues Analyses (Jan. 2002), at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/
pubs/2002 / te rro r/terror. pdf.
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harbor a deep hatred toward the West and believe that partici-
pation in such suicide missions will earn them honor, an eternal
seat next to Allah, and a host of virgins.' Social and religious
scholars assert that they are part of "Islamism," a Jihad-based,
xenophobic, extremist movement that is wholly intolerant of
and profoundly hostile to religious pluralism of any kind.'0
Even more frightening than their perverted fundamentalist be-
liefs and irrational personalities is the fact that they have the
financial ability and global presence to successfully carry out
such highly organized, extensively pre-meditated, and cunningly
orchestrated attacks on United States soil. It is clear that the
new wave of terrorism will continue to be a constant threat to
Americans at home and abroad.
III. AMERICA REACTS TO TERROR WITH LEGISLATION
Still reeling from the shock and pain of September l1th,
Americans looked to the Government for a response that would
punish the enemy, restore a national sense of security, and en-
sure that such an event would not happen in the future. The
Government had to respond with military and legislative force
that was drastic enough to quench the public's immediate desire
for retaliation and vindication, yet possessed the foresight of an
even-handed, practical solution that would be effective in the
long term. President Bush and his Administration asked for and
received the authority to launch a highly publicized "war on ter-
rorism"" and enforce an unprecedented body of legislation in-
cluding the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2002,12
the Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act,13 and the Homeland
Security Act of 2002.14 The three acts have two things in com-
mon: they recognize the need to block access to cockpit controls
so a plane cannot be used as a weapon, and they call for a shift
9 See generally JOHN CLARK MEAD, THE NEW WORLD WAR: A BEHIND THE SCENES
LOOK AT WHY AND How MILITANT MUSLIMS PLAN TO DESTROY WESTERN CIVILIZA-
TION (2002).
10 See WILLIAM J. BENNET, WHY WE FIGHT, 76-101 (2002).
1 See generally SUPERTERRORISM: POLICY RESPONSES 40-56 (Lawrence Freedman
ed., Blackwell Publishing 2002) (discussing the Bush Administration's war on
terrorism).
12 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 1447, 115
Stat. 597 (2002).
13 Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act, H.R. 4635, 107th Cong. (2002) (en-
acted), available at http://thomas.loc.gov (hereinafter "APATA").
14 Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
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from a passive stance on security to a multi-level, "active de-
fense" of the aircraft.'
5
A. AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT
In November of 2001, Congress passed the first piece of legis-
lation, which included physical measures to deter terrorists from
gaining control of the plane. The Act began by creating a
Transportation Security Administration that is part of the De-
partment of Transportation and headed by the Undersecretary
of Transportation for Security. 6 The Undersecretary is charged
with creating and implementing various aviation security pro-
grams immediately following the adoption of the Act. 7 The Act
called on Undersecretary Magaw to require airlines to fortify
cockpit doors with heavy locks and stronger building materials'
and implement methods, such as video monitors that allow pi-
lots to observe activity in the cabin and switches or other wireless
devices that enable flight crews to discreetly notify the pilot of
an emergency or security breach. 19 The Act also authorized the
Undersecretary to develop a program that would recruit, train,
and provide weapons for air marshals. Air marshals would con-
sist of undercover law enforcement officials of the Administra-
tion who would serve in teams of at least two per airplane. z
They would fly alongside civilian passengers, and they would be
authorized to carry weapons and use force when necessary.2'
The third, and most controversial, provision of the Act author-
ized the Undersecretary to create a similar training and arma-
ment program for pilots who volunteered to carry firearms.
2 2
The Undersecretary had the choice of whether to implement
the individual provisions of the Act, and at a Senate Commerce
Committee hearing in May 2001, Undersecretary Magaw an-
nounced that pilots would not be allowed to carry guns into the
15 See Matthew L. Wald, Nation Challenged: Airport Security; Screening of All Checked
Bags Is to Start Today, but Safety Concerns Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at All
(interviewing the head of the FAA).
16 ATSA § 101(a), (b). Note, President Bush electedJohn Magaw as Undersec-
retary of Transportation for Security.
17 ATSA § 101 (d).
18 Id. § 104(a)(1)(B).
"I Id. § 104 (b) (1), (3).
20 Id. § 105(a)(1)-(4).
21 Id. § 105.
22 Id. § 128.
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cockpit. 23 Undersecretary Magaw cited the need for pilots to
concentrate on flying as the primary reason to prohibit arming
pilots. 2" He stated that air marshals should be the only ones to
carry firearms on board because they have special training to
handle firearms, including how to fire them in tight spaces like
the cabin, and training for the events that lead up to a crisis that
calls for such force.25 He suggested that, if need be, pilots could
always use in-flight maneuvers to incapacitate hijackers and rely
on cameras to monitor the results of their actions. 26 Both the
Transportation Secretary, Norman Mineta, and Homeland Se-
curity Director, Tom Ridge,joined Undersecretary Magaw in op-
position to arming pilots. 27 Ironically, in July 2001, just two
months prior to the September l1th attacks, a forty-year-old
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) rule that allowed com-
mercial pilots to carry guns was suddenly rescinded.2' The FAA
adopted the rule in 1961, shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis,
in an effort to avoid hijackings, but over the next four decades,
not even one pilot on a single airline ever took advantage of the
right to carry a gun, effectively rendering the law moot.29
B. ARMING PILOTS AGAINST TERRORISM ACT
1. General Purpose
On July 10, 2002, the House voted by a veto-proof majority of
310-113 to pass the Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act.3 ° Un-
like the Congressional Act presented in November 2001, this bill
did not afford Undersecretary Magaw a choice of whether to
arm pilots. Within two months of the bill's enactment, Under-
secretary Magaw would have to establish a program to deputize
volunteer pilots as "law enforcement officers to defend the flight
23 Associated Press, Government Says Pilots Won't Have Guns in Cockpits, ABC






28 Mary Winchester, For 40 Years Pilots Had Right to Have Guns on Planes (May
16, 2002), available at http://www.geoffmetcalf.com/wwwboard/messages/
2027.html.
29 Id.
30 Leah G. Rothschild, Outweighing Air Travel Safety for Pilots' Immunity, Accu-
RACY IN MEDIA (July 23, 2002), available at http://www.aim.org/publications/
briefings/2002/jul 23.html.
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decks against attacks of criminal violence or air piracy. '31 In or-
der to select, train, and deputize pilots in compliance with the
broad mandate of the Act, Undersecretary Magaw would have to
first create all of the procedural standards that make up the
body of the program. 2 The procedural issues include choosing
the type of firearm and ammunition to be used by pilots, spe-
cific requirements for the training needed to qualify and re-
qualify as federal flight deck officers, guidelines for storage of
firearms on and between flights to ensure safety and accessibil-
ity, and guidelines for the transport of firearms between
flights.3 3 The Undersecretary must create the core protocol for
an armed pilot carrying a gun in an airport and on a plane.
That is, he must define what a pilot is allowed to do as well as
what he is prohibited from doing under normal flight condi-
tions, a terrorist situation, and any other breach of security that
may occur. Moreover, he must define the division of responsi-
bility between two onboard, armed pilots in the event of a secur-
ity breach. He must also draft a procedure for interaction
between armed pilots and armed air marshals in the event of a
security breach, keeping in mind that pilots and air marshals
must be careful not to ruin the air marshals' anonymity.34 One
of the most difficult responsibilities Undersecretary Magaw
would face is to establish a procedure "for ensuring that the fire-
arm of a Federal flight deck officer does not leave the cockpit if
there is a disturbance [on board]." In other words, the House
bill authorizes a pilot to carry a gun into the cockpit of the
plane, but nowhere else. He is only to use the gun in defense of
the cockpit. Thus, if a terrorist or group of terrorists were to
present himself or themselves during a flight, the pilot must re-
main in the cockpit. Undersecretary Magaw has the seemingly
impossible job of drafting rules that anticipate and control all of
the possible reactions a pilot may have in such a situation.
Equally puzzling is that the bill advocates pilots carrying guns
within two months of its passage, but also orders a study of the
likelihood that an errant bullet hitting the electrical system, an-
other sensitive part of the plane, or the skin of the cabin will
cause "catastrophic failure" of the aircraft.36
31 APATA § 2(a).
32 Id. § 2(b) (3).
3- Id. § 2(b) (3) (A)-(D), (J).
34 Id. § 2(b) (3) (F)-(L).
35 Id. § 2(b) (3) (G).
36 Id. § 2(b) (3) (E).
866
ARMING PILOTS WITH HANDGUNS
2. Training, Qualification, and Duration of the Program
In general, Undersecretary Magaw is instructed to base the
requirements for training on standards applicable to air mar-
shals.37 A pilot must, at a minimum, achieve a certain level of
proficiency with a firearm and be able to maintain exclusive con-
trol over it at all times, even when carrying out defensive maneu-
vers.3 8 Theoretically, any pilot who volunteers and completes
the training program is considered qualified; however, there is a
maximum number of pilots that may be deputized. The num-
ber of pilots deputized and authorized to carry firearms "may
not exceed two percent of the total number of pilots that are
employed by air carriers ... on the date of enactment. '' 39 The
program is intended to be in effect for two years beginning on
the date that the two-hundred-fiftieth pilot is deputized.4 ° At
the end of the two years, Undersecretary Magaw must determine
whether the benefits of arming pilots outweigh the risks and
choose to continue or terminate the program."
3. Cost and Liability
The bill grants total immunity to air carriers from liability for
damages in an action filed in federal or state court arising out of
an armed pilot's use or failure to use a firearm.42 In contrast,
the bill only partially shields pilots: an armed pilot shall not be
liable for damages in any federal or state action arising from an
act or omission unless he or she is guilty of gross negligence or
willful misconduct.4 3 When it comes to cost, the bill is less clear.
One section orders Undersecretary Magaw to provide the train-
ing, supervision, and equipment necessary to carry out the pro-
gram at no cost to participating pilots or the air carrier
employing the pilot.44 However, an estimate prepared by the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) stated that implementing
the two-year program would cost about $47 million over the
2003-2007 period, so the money will have to come from some-
37 Id. § 2(c) (2) (A).
38 Id. § 2 (c) (2) (B).
.39 Id. § 2 (d) (4).
40 Id. § 2(i)(1).
41 Id. § 2(i) (2)-(4).
42 Id. § 2(h)(1).
43 Id. § 2(h) (2).
44 Id. § 2(c)(1).
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where. 45 The CBO anticipated about 1,400 pilots being depu-
tized and estimated that it would cost about $8,000 per pilot
annually.46 Additionally, it would cost an extra $500,000 each
year to maintain a modest staff to manage the program. 47 It is
important to note that the CBO could not provide exact figures
for the cost to the private sector and the federal Government
until the Undersecretary designed the specific requirements of
the program.4 8
C. HOMELAND SECURITY ACT
In September of 2002, the Senate passed a very similar bill to
that of the House by an 87-6 majority vote. 49 Unlike the stand-
alone bill passed by the House, however, the Senate's bill in-
cluded the amendment of the mega-bill that would create a new
Department of Homeland Security.5 ° The bill incorporated the
program to arm pilots and added a more extensive training pro-
gram for flight attendants. It included specific language requir-
ing comprehensive self-defense training for flight crew,
including classroom, situational, and hands-on training.5 It
also mandated the development of a wireless, hands-free way to
communicate with the flight deck.5 2 The Bush Administration
was initially opposed to the idea of arming pilots, but eventually
weakened its position under intense lobbying. 5 In the twenty-
four hours leading up to the Senate vote, the Administration
announced it would support a test program that allowed 1,000
pilots to be armed. 54 Supporters of arming pilots were suspi-
cious of the proposed test program, however, for they feared the
45 Rachel Milberg, Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate, Arming Pilots





49 Aviation Security Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-674, § 2949, 104 Stat.
3075 (2002).
50 Christopher M. Wright, Regional Airline Group Fights 'Guns For Pilots' Bill, 20
COMMUTER/REGIONAL AIRLINE NEWS, Iss. 36, Sept. 23, 2002.
51 Aviation Security Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-674, §§ 2949, 501, 104
Stat. 3075 (2002).
52 Id. § 502.
53 Alan Levin, Plan to Arm Pilots Is Taking Off" Lobbying Blitz Pushes Idea of Guns
in the Cockpit Over Airlines' Objections, USA TODAY, Oct. 2, 2002.
54 Gun Owners Triumph in the Senate-Armed Pilots' Provision Passes Overwhelmingly,
GUN OWNERS OF AMERICA (Sept. 6, 2002), available at http://www.gunowners.
org/a090602.htm.
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Administration's test program would serve as a lesser substitute
for the program in the Senate bill.55 The Bush Administration
seemed to do another about face when it released a letter,just as
the debate in the Senate began, that outlined complications
with arming pilots.
56
Proponents did not have to bite their collective nails for long.
On November 25, 2002, President Bush confidently signed the
Homeland Security Act into law, which included the joint
House-Senate provision to arm pilots. After a simple review of
the legislation, it is clear that President Bush has enacted legisla-
tion that fails to strike the delicate balance between emotion
and reason and between the immediate reactions and long-term
goals. More significantly, the President has authorized the pro-
gram to arm pilots without thinking it through to the end. The
legislation does not fully consider the inherent risks of the pro-
gram it mandates.
IV. STRATEGY AND SAFETY
A. LISTEN TO THE EXPERTS
Many of the airline industry's most experienced and
respected airline executives, safety experts, crews, and pilots
think arming pilots is a strategy headed for disaster. The Air
Transport Association, the Head of the Transportation Security
Administration, James Loy, and twenty-one top airline execu-
tives (including American, United, Delta, Northwest, and South-
west)57 tried to head off the bill's passage in the Senate.58 In the
same vein, the President and Chief Operating Officer ofJetBlue
Airways came out publicly in September and said, "[i]n an at-
tempt to make America more safe, Congress has approved legis-
lation that will make flying more dangerous. 59
The program fails to take into consideration the possible un-
intended consequences of having guns with pilots, guns in air-
port terminals, and guns on planes. First, there is the human
factor. A look at the history of commercial aviation reveals that
in spite of extensive flight training, most airplane crashes are
55 Id. (quoting democratic Senator Barbara Boxer of California, "I very much
[worry] that some kind of a test program is going to be put forward by the Ad-
ministration as opposed to what we are doing").
56 Id.
57 Wright, supra note 50.
58 State of Play: Arming Aircrews, 16 AIR SAFETY WEEK, Iss. 38, Oct. 7, 2002.
59 Id.
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due to pilot error: from 1992 through 2002, crew error ac-
counted for 66 percent of commercial crashes.60 This statistic
demonstrates the need for pilots to concentrate on flying, as
well as the undeniable risk that even the finest training and best
intentions can be thwarted by human error. Furthermore, while
armed pilots will undergo the requisite training program Under-
secretary Magaw designs, there is no training that can ensure
that pilots will not make mistakes regarding when and upon
whom to fire. Pilots are not infallible, and a mistake in judg-
ment could be fatal. A pilot could overact to a perceived secur-
ity threat and wound or kill a passenger or crewmember.61
Furthermore, while U.S. aviation law states that a pilot's sched-
uled work time should not exceed eight hours for domestic
flights and twelve hours for international flights, pilots may work
more than sixteen hours straight due to flight extensions and
delays.62 Fatigue and reduced oxygen can eschew perception
and negatively affect reaction time, accuracy, and proper judg-
ment. Consider also the recent reports of intoxicated pilots.6"
Aside from human error, there is no way to know how pilots
will react in a crisis situation, even if they have training. In a
terrorist situation, a pilot would be faced with a difficult decision
of opening the cockpit door or landing the plane as soon as
possible.64 The President of the International Association of
Flight Attendants questions whether pilots would breach proto-
col to try and save their crew and passengers, which could result
60 M. Kristen Rand, Anti-Terrorism, Pistol-Packing Pilots, Shootouts in the Sky Too
Dangerous Pro or Con? The Authors Debate the Question: "Should Airline Pilots be Armed
to Thwart Skyjackers?", CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Oct. 13, 2002.
61 Arming Pilots Would Send Wrong Message, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., avail-
able at http://www.aviationnow.com/content/publication/awst/20011022/avi_
vie2.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2003) (interviewing veteran airline captain Roger
Waldman).
62 Tom Harris, How Airline Crews Work, available at http://travel.howstuffworks.
com/airline-crew4.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2003).
63 See Dennis Powell et al., Pilot Had Arrest Record: Pilot Charged with Trying to Fly
Drunk Has Arrest Record, ABC News (July 2, 2002), available at http://abcnews.go.
com/dailynewsl020702pilot-record.html; see also Lyle Prouse: Pilots and Drinking
(CNN television broadcast, July 3, 2002), available at http://www.cnn.com/2002/
TRAVEL/NEWS/07/03/drunk.pilot.cnna/index.html (recounting Paula Zahn's
interview with pilot Prouse, who was arrested twelve years ago for flying while
intoxicated and served time in federal prison).
64 See Up in Arms: Should Commerical Airline Pilots Be Armed?, CURRENT EVENTS,
Oct. 4, 2002; see alsoJ. VAN DER DENNEN & V. FALGER, SoClo-BIOLOGY AND CON-
FLICT: EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES ON COMPETITION, COOPERATION, VIOLENCE,
AND WARFARE 123-131 (1990) (discussing loyalty and aggression in human groups
and territoriality and threat perceptions in urban humans).
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in a misfire in the cabin or the terrorists taking control of thegun.65 Moreover, crews may be tempted to open the cockpitdoor to access the pilots and their guns for help. 66
Secondly, the program does not factor in the inherent risksassociated with guns. Handguns have proven to be a high-riskhome-defense tool, and in many civilian and police instances,guns have caused much more harm than good. For example,FBI statistics reflect that for every person who uses a handgun tokill a criminal in self-defense, 109 people have died because ofhandguns.67 More importantly, police statistics involving highlytrained and experienced officers show that 21 percent of of-ficers are shot with their own weapons. Surprisingly, even vet-eran officers have only an 18 percent to 22 percent hit ratio inarmed confrontations.68 This translates into a much morefrightening statistic when guns are fired at 35,000 feet in thenarrow confines of an airplane cabin. Even if pilots were able tomaintain the highly trained officers' hit rate, that would mean78 percent to 82 percent of the time a gun is fired, it wouldpierce some part of the plane, a passenger, or a crew member.69In addition, the risk of accidental discharge always exists.The effects of a stray bullet on the integrity of the plane arestill not fully understood, and it seems imprudent and irrespon-sible to allow the pilot program to begin without fully knowingthe risks. Many supporters of arming pilots argue that it is sim-ply "a myth that an airplane will rapidly depressurize and crashif a bullet pierces the fuselage."7 Design experts at BoeingCompany, a major supplier of commercial jets, however, warnthat if a bullet were to break a passenger window, "unbelted trav-elers near the area would be in danger-and pilots would have toimmediately decrease altitude to regulate the pressure inside
65 See Dave Marash, Armed and Protective: Idea of Giving Airline Crews WeaponsTakes Hight, ABC News (Aug. 4, 2002), available at http://abcnews.go.com/sec-tions /nightline/ Nightline /n020731-cockpitguns.html.
66 Id.
67 Rand, supra note 60.
68 Id.; see also Rothschild, supra note 30, available at http://www.aim.org/publi-
cations/briefings/2002/jul 23.html (discussing statistics from study by the Vio-lence Policy Center).
69 Rand, supra note 60.
70 Jennifer Oldham, Pilots Ramp Up Campaign to Allow Guns in Cockpit, GE-OCRAWLER: THE KNOWLEDGE ARCHIWE (May 28, 2002), available at www.geocrawler.com/mail/msg-raw.php3?msg-id=87
8 0 4 3 8 (quoting Captain Dennis J. Dolan,
who flies 7 3 7-8 00s for Delta).
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the aircraft.' In a letter to lawmakers, the Air Transport Asso-
ciation and twenty-one airline chief executives also voiced their
concerns about the effects of bullets on pressurized cabin and
cautioned that possible firings into instrument panels had not
been adequately studied.7 2 Most significantly, the Homeland Se-
curity Department is not, itself, convinced that a bullet would
not cause fatal damage to a plane. Along with the pilot pro-
gram, a study will be conducted on various safety consequences
of a gun being fired in a plane during flight. While it may not
cause the plane to immediately crash, the direct risks to passen-
gers mentioned by Boeing experts and overall risks to the stabil-
ity of the plane are severe enough to think twice before arming
pilots.
There is a third concern with logistics of carrying and trans-
porting guns in airports and on planes. For years, airport secur-
ity has been designed to keep dangerous weapons out of
secured terminals and introducing thousands of lethal weapons
into the system seems counterproductive.7' This raises several
important questions. What procedure should be followed if a
firearm is suddenly missing? Should the airport freeze all
flights, evacuate the terminals, and search person-by-person? At
what point can activities resume? What if the weapon is never
found? These are difficult strategic questions to answer, but
very important ones given statistics such as the following: be-
tween October 1999 and August 2001, the U.S. Department of
Justice reported its agencies had 775 firearms lost or stolen.74
The storage of guns further complicates the issue. On the
plane, guns would have to be secured in lock boxes, to which
only pilots have access, while still allowing quick and easy access
in case of emergency. Alternatively, pilots could wear holsters
and carry the weapons on their person at all times. Each option
has major drawbacks. Lock boxes would have to be installed in
every commercial cockpit, which would take time and cost more
money, time being a primary motivating factor in the justifica-
tion for arming pilots. If pilots carry the weapons, they would
have to leave them in the cockpit if they were to get up and exit
for any reason, such as using the restroom. This leaves a gun
sitting alone in the cockpit or a co-pilot, who could already have
71 Id. (quoting Liz Verdier of Boeing Company).
72 Wright, supra note 50.
73 Rand, supra note 60.
74 Id.
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his own gun, holding the absent pilot's gun and still flying the
plane. Also, there is a question of whether pilots will take the
guns home with them or check them at the airport. Pilots' fami-
lies may object to having guns in the home and there are far-
reaching safety and liability issues tied to this option as well.
The alternative requires equipping all airports with secured stor-
age facilities and possibly personnel to monitor the firearm arse-
nal at all times.
B. IF AIR MARSHALS, WHY NOT PILOTS?
Much of the language in the provision to arm pilots mirrors
that of the air marshal program. Undersecretary Magaw is in-
structed to base the pilot training program and certification
standards on those of air marshals. Some may ask why air mar-
shals cannot be used to justify arming pilots, after all, they are
both carrying guns onto planes. The answer involves a funda-
mental aspect of basic social theory: organizations and speciali-
zation.7 5 Organizations, such as the U.S. Government, are
formed to accomplish large-scale objectives that would other-
wise be unattainable on an individual level.76 The Government
subdivides itself into smaller organizations such as the Transpor-
tation Security Administration. Once divided into sub-units, the
success of an organization hinges on specialization.77 Specializa-
tion means that tasks are "assigned to each position as official
duties," and the "clear-cut division of labor" results in "expert-
ness" among individuals.7 8 Studies have repeatedly shown that
success depends on the "one-thing-at-a-time approach."79 Fur-
thermore, reliable performance of tasks calls for clear standard
operating procedures that produce specific actions and avoid
uncertainty. 80 The idea of arming pilots and the legislation that
outlines their standard operating procedures violates the basic
tenants of organizational social theory. In the hierarchy of offi-
cial duties, a pilot's job is clear: he must focus his full attention
during take-off, landing, and any time in between on flying the
plane. This is a task that requires a high level of knowledge,
75 See generally WILLIAM REGIS FARRELL, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO
TERRORISM: IN SEARCH OF AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY 69-118 (1982).
76 Id. at 20.
77 Jd.
78 Id. at 21 (explaining the findings of studies by German sociologist Max
Weber).
79 Id. at 25.
80 Id. at 26-27.
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skill, concentration, and quick decision-making.81 A pilot can-
not afford to be distracted or have his attention diverted from
flying, nor should he have to choose between his duties as a pi-
lot and his duties as a federal law enforcement officer.8 2 This
confusion of duties would undermine the efficiency and success
of the given objective, which is to fly the plane safely and re-
spond effectively to a terrorist or non-terrorist based situation.
It is important to remember the invaluable lesson learned from
September 11th: a pilot is already in charge of, trained and prac-
ticed in, and responsible for the ultimate weapon - the airplane
itself. Moreover, the broad legislative mandate that serves as the
operating directions for the program cannot result in specific
actions and actually produces more unknown factors than it
eliminates.
Air marshals, however, have the elite training and singularity
of duty to safely monitor the cabin and effectively deal with any
security breach that may occur. Air marshals, seated among pas-
sengers, have the distinct advantage of knowing what is going on
in the cabin at all times, unlike pilots who are segregated in the
cockpit. Furthermore, many air marshals have police or military
backgrounds, including FBI and DEA,"3 and every air marshal is
required to complete an advanced marksmanship skills test.
The test is timed and requires them to be able to fire rapidly
and accurately at multiple short-range targets. Air marshals will
have more time than pilots to train in crisis-response, handling
firearms, and self-defense because it is their only job. FAA
spokesman Hank Price explains that air marshal training can be
accelerated or specialized based on what the recruit already
knows."4 They also have the time and resources to focus on anti-
terror training, which experts say requires a different set of skills
such as knowing specific techniques to subdue terrorists and as-
sist hostages.8 5 The head of the Airline Transport Association,
81 Tom Harris, How Airline Crews Work, available at http://travel.howstuffworks.
com/airline-crew4.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2003) (discussing the details of a
pilot's duties while flying a plane).
82 Elliot Hester, Pilot Shouldn't Double as Security Guard, THE PLAIN DEALER, Sept.
29, 2002, at K7.




85 See BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, FIGHTING TERRORISM: How DEMOCRACIES CAN DE-
FEAT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS 144-46 (1995) (discussing train-
ing special forces to fight terrorism).
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Carol Hallett, believes the "wisest investment in [improving] se-
curity" is hiring more air marshals because they are trained to
provide "professional protection." 6 Likewise, the president of
the International Association of Flight Attendants feels that hav-
ing a gun in the cockpit is useless without crucial "defensive ca-
pabilities in the cabin" such as air marshals.8 7
The primary criticism of air marshals is that it will take too
long to train and schedule enough of them to meet the demand
of all the commercial airlines. The air marshal program, how-
ever, has been operating since 1970 and had over 2,000 mar-
shals in the sky per day at its operational peak.88 Since then,
numbers have dwindled, but there has been a dramatic surge in
volunteers and applicants for the program since September
11th. 9 The Department of Transportation's website has re-
ceived over 5.3 million hits and reports over 150,000 applica-
tions have been downloaded in 2002.90 The fact that most
commercial airlines have reduced their overall number of flights
due to financial concerns coupled with the increase in appli-
cants means that supplying enough air marshals to meet the de-
mand will not be a problem. Thus, it is merely an issue of
training the eager recruits, and Secretary of Transportation Nor-
man Mineta notes that the federal program is graduating 50 air
marshals a day.' The pilot program, in stark contrast, has not
even been created yet by Undersecretary Magaw, and once it is,
the pilots will still have to be trained, and planes and terminals
will have to be outfitted with the proper equipment. It seems as
though it will take just as long, if not longer, to arm pilots. Plus,
the pilot program limits the number of armed pilots, and the
program itself could be discontinued after two years. Instead,
the money and manpower could be invested in the well-estab-
lished air marshal program that accomplishes the same objective
more safely.
86 See Marash, supra note 65.
87 Id.
88 CNN, Job Seekers High on Air Marshal Openings (Oct. 26, 2001), available at
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C. THINKING OUTSIDE THE LOCK Box
1. Cabin Safety
Although some studies correlate another terrorist attack on
an airplane with an estimated low likelihood," senior adminis-
trative officials like Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Sec-
retary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge have repeatedly warned
the public that another terrorist attack is a matter of when and
not if.9 3 Because there is no way to know when or in what form
the terrorists will come, better intelligence, safety measures, per-
sonnel, and prevention are needed across the board in airline
security. Given the airline industry's long history of lax and inef-
fective security, it is naive to think that such a flawed system will
be improved by such a quick fix. 94 President Eisenhower once
remarked that "organization cannot make a genius out of an
incompetent ... and disorganization . . . [will lead to] ineffi-
ciency and can easily lead to disaster."95 In other words, the
Government cannot just make cosmetic or superficial changes
to an incompetent commercial airline security system and ex-
pect them to be effective. Changes in safety and procedure
must come from the inside out, and they must start at the begin-
ning of a long chain of events that begins at an airport terminal
and ends at the cockpit of a plane. To their credit, the three
pieces of legislation discussed earlier incorporate security mea-
sures designed to "thwart potential hijackers" before they ever
board the plane. 96 For example, airport screeners are now fed-
eral employees subject to background checks, an armed officer
must be present at each security checkpoint, and there are more
stringent procedures for screening passengers as well as checked
and carry-on luggage.97 Checked luggage is now screened for
explosives and carry on luggage is x-rayed and searched for vari-
ous traditional and non-traditional items that could be used as a
92 See MICHAEL E. O'HANLON ET AL., PROTECTING THE AMERICAN HOMELAND: A
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 6, Table 1-1 (2002).
93 SUPERTERRORISM: POLICY RESPONSES 41 (Lawrence Freedman ed., Blackwell
Publishing 2002).
94 See supra note 61, available at http://www.aviationnow.com/content/publi-
cation/awst/20011022/avi vie2.htm.
q5 DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, MANDATE FOR CHANGE 1953-1956: TI-E WHITE
HOUSE YEARS 114 (1963).
96 Hester, supra note 82 (quoting Werner Shubert, spokesman for the Swedish
Pilots' Association).
97 See MICHAEL E. O'HANLON ET AL., PROTECTING THE AMERICAN HOMELAND: A
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 64 (2002).
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weapon. Luggage screening is the kind of effective preventive
measure that keeps weapons and bombs out of the cabin and
hull of the plane, thereby anticipating terrorist methods and
robbing terrorists of their tools. There remains, however, the
critical issue of flight deck safety. The value of specially trained
air marshals has already been discussed. The money, time, and
attention that will go into the program to arm pilots could also
be better spent on things like installing deadbolt locks onto
cockpit doors, making cockpit doors bullet-proof, making cock-
pit doors that give pilots a one-way-see-through capability, in-
stalling hidden cabin surveillance cameras with flight deck
monitors, and giving the flight crew a covert way to communi-
cate with one another.98 For anyone who thinks these measures
would be too costly or take too long to install, he or she can look
to JetBlue Airways, a popular commercial national airline.
Within weeks of September 1Ith, JetBlue had already outfitted
its entire fleet with "bulletproof cockpit doors, locked with tita-
nium dead bolts . . . [and] began installing cabin surveillance
cameras to help protect [its] flight attendants and customers
while allowing [its] pilots to monitor the cabin."99
2. Flight Crew
Flight attendants need the tools necessary to defend them-
selves, their passengers, and the cockpit, considering they would
be the first ones to encounter terrorist or other security
threats.1' The cabin should be the locus of defense, for a ter-
rorist or any one else must first subdue or at least get past the
passengers and crew to even get to the cockpit. Dawn Deeks,
spokeswoman for the Association of Flight Attendants, which
represents over 50,000 flight attendants, warns they are "no
more prepared to defend [themselves] and [their] passengers
than [they] were on the morning of September 11. ''" °1 Funding
and training needs to focus on an extensive self-defense and
98 See supra note 61, available at http://www.aviationnow.com/content/publi-
cation/awst/20011022/avivie2.htm.
99 Dave Barger, No Guns in Flight, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2002, at Al (quoting
representative of JetBlue Airways).
100 See generally Tom Harris, How Airline Crews Work, available at http://
travel.howstuffworks.com/airline-crew4.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2003) (provid-
ing an explanation of flight crew and flight attendant qualification, training, and
official duties while on board an aircraft and during flight).
101 Associated Press, Hight Attendants Want Better Self-Defense Training, ABC News
(Sept. 5, 2001), available at http://abcnews.go.com/us/DailyNews/homefront02
0905.html.
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counter-terrorism program. For example, Northwest Airlines
agreed to pay flight attendants to take a voluntary eight-hour
self-defense course from an Israeli security firm. 1 2 The Home-
land Security Act does include a broad mandate for extra flight
crew training, but flight attendants around the country have
voiced concern that the "government's training requirements
[are not] comprehensive enough to give flight attendants confi-
dence that they could protect themselves.""1 3 Once again, the
pilot program's allotted financial and energy resources could be
better distributed to improving the defensive capabilities of
those in the cabin since the cabin would be the first site of any
problem.
3. Non-Lethal Weapons
Not arming pilots does not mean there should be no weapons
at all on board. Taser guns, commonly called "stun" guns are a
viable alternative. Taser guns fire a 50,000-volt electric shock °4
for five seconds at a time that will completely disable a person
from a range of up to fifteen feet, without a lethal effect.10 5
Once incapacitated, flight crew or air marshals can use proper
restraints such as handcuffs to ensure the attacker remains sub-
dued. Most notably, the electric shock that taser guns deliver
poses no threat to other passengers or crew, nor can it cause any
harm to the aircraft. Many airline and military experts agree
that taser guns could "easily be made standard throughout the
industry and become part of the aircraft minimum equip-
ment."'0 6 United Airlines has illustrated that taser guns can be
quickly and easily incorporated into flight deck security. In
2001, United Airlines began installing taser guns in electroni-
cally coded lock boxes in more than 500 of its airplanes and
ordered training for both pilots and flight attendants.107
102 Id.
103 Id. (quoting Mollie Reiley, union trustee representing over 8,500 flight
attendants).
104 Mesa Air Planning To Arm Pilots with Stun Guns, AIRWISE NEWS (Oct. 24,
2002), at http://news.airwise.com/stories/2001/10/1003948743.html.
105 Mike Cronin, ALPA Testifies in Favor of Armed Pilots, Report of Security Hear-
ings Held in the House and Senate (Sept. 28, 2001), at www.capapilots.org/
securityhearings092801 .htm.
106 See supra note 61, available at http://www.aviationnow.com/content/publi-
cation/awst/20011022/avi vie2.htm.
107 David Carpenter, United Airlines Plans to Arm Pilots With Stun Guns, NORTH
COUNTRY TIMES, Nov. 16, 2001, available at http://www.nctimes.com/articles/
2001/11/16/export23388.txt.
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Lawmakers, however, have ignored the high value and low risk
of taser guns.
V. FINANCING
The most recent cost estimate of arming pilots, provided by
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) for the Department of
Homeland Security was $47 million over 2003-2007. However,
no one can really know how much funding will be needed until
Undersecretary Magaw creates the specific program. The CBO's
preliminary estimate seems especially modest compared to the
$250 million projected by James Loy, acting head of the Trans-
portation Security Administration and the $100 million estimate
by the Air Line Pilot Association, the nation's largest pilots
union. s08 Given the war in Iraq, the languishing status of the
airline industry, and the fact that the Transportation Security
Administration has said it "cannot meet congressionally man-
dated security deadlines without additional funding," policymak-
ers must spend their money and manpower wisely." °9
Policymakers must avoid excessive costs in achieving any given
level of protection against terrorism,10 and the $47 million or
much more that it will take to arm pilots could be spent more
wisely. The Homeland Security Act has already stipulated that
the private sector will not be called on to contribute to the cost
of the program. Thus, it seems the main source of funding will
be tax dollars."' Since the public will be paying the bill, it is
important to note that many public opinion polls and airport
surveys reveal that as much as 67 percent of passengers are
against arming pilots, and many of those have expressed deep
concern about the consequences. 12
VI. LIABILITY
Despite the severity of the intended and unintended conse-
quences of arming pilots, the Homeland Security Act sets a legal
liability standard that provides substantial immunity for airlines
108 Levin, supra note 53.
109 Id.
110 See MICHAEL E. O'HANLON ET AL., PROTECTING THE AMERICAN HOMELAND: A
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 79 (2002).
111 Id. at 140, 145 (outlining director of Homeland Security Tom Ridge's pro-
posed funding for aviation security in 2003 quoted at $4.8 billion, a tripling of
the 2002 budget and an increase of $2.2 billion even taking into account post-
September 11 supplemental appropriations).
112 See supra note 64.
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and pilots but little recourse for any victims. Commercial air-
lines will enjoy total federal and state court immunity from an
armed pilot's use or failure to use a firearm, and pilots will re-
ceive the same immunity unless they engage in gross negligence
or willful misconduct.11 The inadequacy of such a liability sys-
tem is threefold. First, the subjective nature of gross negligence
results in an ad hoc analysis of pilot's conduct, which provides
little guidance for pilots and little grounds for any cause of ac-
tion. Second, a blanket standard of immunity is inappropriate
given the wide spectrum of events to which it will be applied.
Third, there is no guidance for awarding damages.
The following discussion on the issues surrounding liability
will focus on pilots, as opposed to the airlines, for two reasons.
One, commercial airline carriers are given total immunity,
which eliminates any debate about the legal liability standard
being applied. Two, airline carriers do not have a choice in
whether or not to participate in the program to arm pilots. The
Homeland Security Act clearly states that airlines must allow any
pilot who wants to volunteer for the program to do so, and if he
qualifies as a federal law enforcement officer, allow him to carry
a gun." 4 Thus, because airlines are not given a choice in the
matter, they should not be held liable for the conduct of their
armed pilots.
A. GROss NEGLIGENCE: A SLIPPERY STANDARD
Courts across the country have struggled with the definition
of gross negligence." 5 The authors of Prosser and Keeton on the
Law of Torts, a leading authority on tort law, states that gross
negligence is "so nebulous" as to have "no generally accepted
meaning.""' 6 Similarly, the Mississippi Supreme Court has said
"there is no precise definition of gross negligence.""' 7 When
forced to commit to a definition, courts have created a variety of
phrases: "want of even slight care and diligence,""' "extreme
"1 APATA § 2(h)(1) & (2).
114 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 2, 116 Stat. 2135
(2002).
115 SeeJones v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1037, 1048 (S.D. Tex. 1996); see also
FDIC v. Gravee, 966 F. Supp. 622, 636 (N.D. Il1. 1997).
116 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 34
(5th ed. 1984).
117 McTeer v. Warsi, 1999 WL 33537210, at *2 (N.D. Miss. 1999).
118 State v. Vinzant, 7 So. 917, 922 (La. 1942).
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departure from ordinary care or the want of even scant care,"' 1 9
"an act or omission done with conscious indifference to harmful
consequences,"1 20 and "consciously indifferent [conduct] . . .
[that] create[s] an extreme degree of risk."'12' It is apparent
from the examples that gross negligence, no matter how it is
phrased, requires a slightly higher degree of culpability or in-
tent than ordinary negligence, which involves merely not using
reasonable care. 122 Gross negligence seems to fall somewhere
between ordinary negligence and willful misconduct (the other
standard for pilot culpability), and it is customarily a question of
fact for the jury to decide. 123 Ordinary negligence, the basis for
gross negligence, is problematic, for it requires some "norm" for
the appropriate degree of precaution - an objectively reasona-
ble response of a reasonably prudent person. 12' There is really
no way, however, to determine how a reasonable person would
respond to a terrorist attack on an airplane. Although some sort
of government regulatory standard could try to establish the the-
oretical norm, 25 it would most likely not hold up to reality, and
the Homeland Security Act makes no attempt to establish such a
norm. Thus, if reasonable conduct or care cannot be estab-
lished, how will juries be able to tell if a pilot's actions deviate so
severely from that reasonable care standard as to justify a find-
ing of gross negligence? More importantly, pilots cannot know
in advance what actions for which they will and will not be held
accountable. While this slippery standard may be tolerable in a
common tort setting, the lack of a precise definition becomes
unacceptable when applied to pilots choosing whether or not to
fire their guns.
B. THE LIABILITY STANDARD: ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL
A terrorist attack is unlike any other non-terrorist security
breach that may occur, and therefore requires a different stan-
"9 Ambrose v. New Orleans Police Dep't & Ambulance Serv., 639 So.2d 216,
220 (La. 1994).
120 Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235, 1250 (10th Cir. 2000).
121 Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 21-22 (Tex. 1994).
122 See Schultz v. Northeast Ill. Reg'l Commuter R.R. Corp., 775 N.E.2d 964,
979 (Ill. 2002) (defining ordinary negligence as "the failure to do something
which a reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of something which a
reasonably careful person would not do . . . under the circumstances").
123 Albright v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., 696 A.2d 1159, 1165 (Pa. 1997).
124 See MICHAEL E. O'HANLON ET AL., PROTECTING THE AMERICAN HOMELAND: A
PRELIMINARY ANALYsis 134 (2002).
125 Id.
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dard to which pilots are held accountable. Both on the ground
and in-flight, armed pilots will have to choose, when faced with
what seems like a security breach, whether or not to use their
firearm. 126 Under a real terrorist situation, the current standard
of gross negligence seems fitting. Understandably, pilots and ju-
ries will have a lot of leeway to determine whether the pilot ac-
ted appropriately given the likely extraordinary and terrifying
circumstances. Terrorism, however, is not the only emergency
an armed pilot will face; in fact, it is highly unlikely. A more
common situation may include a drunken passenger, a case of
air rage, a suicidal passenger, a fight between passengers, or a
clash between a passenger and a flight attendant. While such
incidences can be very stressful and unpleasant, they do not rise
to the level of a terrorist attack. It is possible to imagine what a
reasonably prudent person would do under similar circum-
stances. 12  Ideally, a separate, ordinary negligence standard
could be applied to non-terrorist situations. Ordinary negli-
gence, requiring a lower threshold than gross negligence, would
be beneficial for two reasons. One, armed pilots would be moti-
vated to act with greater care and prudence when assessing a
situation and choosing to involve themselves. Two, in the case
of accidental shootings or pilots' misjudgment of appropriate
force, victims are more likely to receive compensation, for it is
not likely that commercial airline pilots will engage in the wan-
ton or willful disregard of caution or care that is required for
gross negligence. The two levels of liability may prove to be im-
possible in practice, though, because a pilot may not be able to
tell ahead of time who is a terrorist or what acts are terrorist-
based, and, therefore, which standard to use.
128
There are countless examples of accidental shootings and po-
lice, military, and innocent civilians being wounded or killed by
friendly fire 129 that illustrate the tragic results of an incorrect
126 Note, although the enacted law states pilots are only to use their firearms in
defense of the cockpit, it has already been discussed that there is no way to pre-
dict whether they will follow that rule in a crisis situation.
127 See MICHAEL E. O'HANLON ET AL., PROTECTING THE AMERICAN HOMELAND: A
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 133 (2002) (suggesting the "feasibility of a negligence"
standard).
128 Cockpit Intruder Returned to Miami, WPVI.COM (Feb. 8, 2002), available at
http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/news/02082002 nw-intrudereturns.html (describ-
ing event involving agitated passenger who stormed the cockpit door and tried to
kick it down).
129 See Micheal Eugene Mullen, American Friendly Fire Notebook, The American
War Library (Nov. 11, 1996), at www.members.aol.com/amenvar/ff/ff.htm (list-
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assumption or misreading of the situation when guns are in-
volved and the difficulty in applying a blanket standard of liabil-
ity. Two notable incidents serve as a good comparison for the
unpredictability in applying law to such situations. The first in-
cident involves four policemen of the New York Special Crimes
Unit shooting an unarmed street vendor named Amadou Diallo
in February 1999. 3° The policemen thought Diallo was a serial
rapist they had been looking for and believed he was going for a
gun when really he was reaching for his beeper.' Although the
police were incorrect on both counts, they fired 41 times and hit
Diallo with 19 bullets. The police were charged with intentional
second-degree murder, second-degree murder with depraved in-
difference for human life, and reckless endangerment.
3 2 All
four officers were found innocent by an NYPD investigative
panel that decided the officers did not violate any procedural
guidelines. 13 3 An $81 million lawsuit by Diallo's family against
the officers is still pending. 134 The Diallo example illustrates
how easily a case of mistaken identity or misinterpretation of
action can occur and instantly turn deadly. Pilots could be in
very similar circumstances in terminals or on airplanes, espe-
cially if they are coming out of the confines of the cabin to re-
spond to a perceived security breach. It is important to note
that the Diallo verdict was met with political protest and indig-
nation, especially by minority communities who believed the po-
lice officers' actions were motivated by racial and ethnic bias. 135
Security measures enacted by legislators and taken by individu-
als since September 11 have raised similar controversy over ra-
cial profiling and ethnic prejudice. Pilots' action or inaction
ing the American War Library's best estimates on friendly fire casualties, both
fatal and non-fatal, based on historic War Department, Department of the Navy
and Department of Defense casualty reports" for World War II, Korea, Vietnam,
and the Persian Gulf).
130 Bryan Robinson, Diallo Officers' Self-Defense Case Hinges on Light and Autopsy
Evidence, COuRTTV ONLINE (Feb. 4, 2000), at http://www.courttv.com/national/
diallo/012800backgroundctv.html (discussing detailed background of the inci-
dents surrounding the shooting).
131 Id.
132 Id.
131 Amadou Diallo: A Timeline, Crime and Punishment (Apr. 29, 2001), at
http://crime.about.com/library/blfiles/bldiallo.htm (providing detailed chro-
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will likely be subject to the same scrutiny and could cause similar
political fallout.'36
The other example involves two American soldiers in Afghani-
stan accidentally releasing a bomb onto Canadian officers, kill-
ing four and wounding more. 13 7 Just after 2 a.m. on April 17,
2002, the Americans mistook muzzle flashes on the ground from
a Canadian training operation for enemy fire. 138 The officers
blamed heavy fog, flying in a volatile territory, and army-admin-
istered amphetamines as contributing factors to their error in
judgment.'3 9 They were charged with involuntary manslaugh-
ter, assault, and dereliction of duties in addition to facing a
court martial.140 Despite the conditions, the officers were held
liable for their mistake. The American officers are living proof
that even highly trained, elite fighter pilots can make devastat-
ing mistakes. Unlike the Diallo officers, however, they were
found to have violated procedure. The two incidents show the
difficulties courts and juries will face in applying consistent lia-
bility standards to judgment calls by armed officers in crisis situ-
ations and in determining the appropriate punishment.
C. DAMAGES: How OFTEN AND How BIG
Even if a pilot is found to be grossly negligent or guilty of
willful misconduct, it will be very difficult for ajury to fairly as-
sess damages. Because armed pilots are a new phenomenon,
many liability cases for events arising out of a pilot's use or fail-
ure to use his firearm will be a case of first impression.41 ' Juries
will have little precedent on which to base damages, which could
result in inconsistent jury awards. Pilots may be lulled into a
false sense of security regarding their behavior if a series of ju-
ries finds no liability or awards very little in damages. However,
a trend of large jury awards may discourage pilots from acting
altogether-an equally undesirable outcome. 4 2 After juries de-
cide when to award damages, they must determine how much.
136 Id.
137 See Deadly Error in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2002), available at
www.warchronicle.com/terrorwar/soldierstories/ canadian.htm.
138 Id.




142 See generally THE LIABLITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY
AND INNOVATION (Peter Huber & Robert Litan, eds., Brookings 1991).
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Will losses be limited to those who were killed, on the plane, or
will it extend to those on the ground or in buildings?143 A com-
mercial pilot may have the assets to cover an accidental injury or
shooting, but what if he is found liable for catastrophic dam-
ages? Will juries, courts, and the legislature simply allow hun-
dreds of victims to go uncompensated? Aside from
compensatory damages, juries may feel a pilot's conduct merits
punitive (exemplary) damages; however, some courts feel that
gross negligence does not carry enough malice or culpable in-
tent to warrant punitive damages.'44 Punitive damages 4 5 are
levied against a defendant to punish the defendant for "outra-
geous, malicious, or otherwise morally culpable conduct," and
to deter the defendant and others from committing the same or
similar acts in the future.'46 Juries may feel pressured to find
the slightly more serious "willful misconduct" as a basis of liabil-
ity to avoid the cap on punitive damages. Distorted verdicts will
undermine airline safety jurisprudence and send a dangerous
message to jurors everywhere.
VII. POLICY AND ETHICS
The Homeland Security Act and its controversial provision to
arm pilots have been heavily criticized as bad policy. Many air-
line industry commentators thought it was too contentious and
would take weeks to pass, 147 and several military experts caution
against such "out-of-the-box-thinking. "148 One often high-
lighted shortcoming of arming pilots is that it focuses too heav-
ily on the recurrence of an airline attack like those of
September l1th, rather than on "reducing vulnerability" of air-
lines more "comprehensively."' 49 The theory behind the legisla-
143 See MICHAEL E. O'HANLON ET AL., PROTECTING THE AMERICAN HOMELAND: A
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 134 (2002).
144 See Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Powell, 19 F. Supp. 2d 678, 682-83 (N.D. Tex.
1998).
145 TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001(5) (Vernon Supp. 1994) (de-
fining "exemplary damages" as "any damages awarded as a penalty or by way of
punishment," which includes punitive damages).
146 Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 40-41 (Tex.
1998).
147 Wright, supra note 50.
148 Dr. Marybeth Peterson Ulrich & Dr. Conrad C. Crane, Potential Changes in
U.S. Civil-Military Relations, DEFEATING TERRORISM: STRATEGIC ISSUES ANALYSES 59
(Jan. 2002), available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2002/terror/
terror.pdf.
149 See MICHAEL E. O'HANLON ET AL., PROTECTING THE AMERICAN HOMELAND: A
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 2 (2002).
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tion is reactive as opposed to proactive. Reactive policy
"concentrates on the 'last war' rather then the possible next
one.""O In other words, current policy has airlines merely ad-
justing to what terrorists have already done, which keeps airlines
always one step behind the terrorists. While it is undeniably im-
portant to reinforce potential targets against future attacks for
purposes of both deterrence and minimizing the effects of an
attack, 1 ' it is more important to adopt a more proactive policy
that pools and analyzes intelligence sources and employs pre-
emptive measures that stop terrorism from happening in the
first place. 15 2
In addition to being merely "consequence management,"'' 53
the program to arm pilots is problematic because it is a very visi-
ble measure of force. Pilots carrying guns in airports and onto
flights everyday creates a "para-military civil defense force"'154
and pseudo-police state to which Americans are not accus-
tomed. Dr. Leonard Wong, formerly of the Program Analysis
and Evaluation Directorate for the U.S. Military and currently of
the Strategic Studies Institute, points out that "Americans want
the security, but an overt military [type] presence goes against
the American way of life. Planning should take place now on
shifting to a domestic security posture that produces a minimal
signature." 55 While the idea of pilots with guns may be reassur-
ing in theory, the sight of them is likely to make many passen-
gers uneasy. It is comforting to imagine a strong, brave pilot
brandishing a handgun in defense of his cockpit, but what pas-
sengers would really see is a middle-aged pilot, someone's dad,
husband, or even grandfather, carrying a gun to work everyday,
carrying a gun into the restaurant at an airport terminal, and
onto the plane, as well as being asked to shoot anyone who
presents a serious threat. Such images are not as easy to live
with. Dr. Wong also notes that as time passes, and the "images of
150 Id.
151 BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, FIGHTING TERRORISM: How DEMOCRACIES CAN DE-
FEAT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS 27 (1995).
152 Id. at 27-28.
153 Lieutenant Colonel AntuiloJ. Echevarria, Homeland Security Issues: A Stra-
tegic Perspective, DEFEATING TERRORISM: STRATEGIC ISSUES ANALYSES 34 (Jan.
2002), available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/20O2/terror/terror.
pdf.
154 Id. at 36.
155 Dr. Leonard Wong, Maintaining Public Support for Military Operations,
DEFEATING TERRORISM: STRATEGIC ISSUES ANALYSES 69 (Jan. 2002), available at
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2002/terror/terror.pdf.
886
ARMING PILOTS WITH HANDGUNS
collapsing towers and [the] burning Pentagon wear off"' 1 56 it
will be harder to justify such an overt display of force.
Few critics have talked about the ethical implications of plac-
ing the onerous burden on pilots to choose whether or not to
carry a gun. Of course the program should not be mandatory
given the volatile personal, social, and political issues surround-
ing guns; however, even a pilot in a voluntary program faces a
difficult personal and professional dilemma. A pilot's private
feelings about guns and potentially being called on to shoot
and/or kill could drastically conflict with his desire to serve his
country, and his airline, and protect his airplane and passen-
gers. Co-workers may treat a fellow pilot who chooses not to
carry a gun differently or negatively. Moreover, a social stigma
may be attached to pilots who refuse to participate in the arma-
ment program. They could be labeled as traitors or their patri-
otism could be called into question.
Take for example, the recent incident in July 2002 at Los An-
geles International Airport. A man carrying a knife and two
handguns opened fire at the El Al Airline ticket counter killing
two and wounding four others. 157 If an armed pilot had been in
the terminal, would he have chosen to get involved? Officially,
it is not clear whether he would be obligated to use his gun or if
such a situation exceeds his scope of authority. The legal differ-
ence would bear upon post-incident liability for the pilot, the
airport, and anyone else directly involved. More importantly,
however, is the personal choice the pilot would have to make in
such critical circumstances. If he decides to shoot and does so
accurately, he has just shot a man, which can have serious and
long-term emotional effects on him and his family. If he misses,
he may either hit an innocent bystander or attract the gunman's
unwanted attention and become a target himself. Alternatively,
if he does not act, he could suffer tremendous personal guilt
and public persecution for not using his weapon. If a pilot, who
chooses not to be armed, were present, he could also be blamed
for what he could have done had he only had a gun. The Los
Angeles gunman example illustrates how carrying a gun changes
the pilot's role in security and in the eyes of the public.
Another seldom talked about ethical predicament that may
arise is the public's right to know if their plane's pilots are carry-
156 Id. at 68.
157 Charles Feldman, Los Angeles Airport Shooting Kills 3, CNN News (July 5,
2002), available at http://www.cnn.com/20O2/US/07/04/la.airport.shooting.
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ing firearms. 158 Some passengers may not want to know if their
pilots are armed, while others may insist on it. Passengers may
even vow to only fly on planes with armed pilots, or they could
refuse to fly on such planes. The airlines would then face a
scheduling nightmare of having to make reservations according
to passengers' gun preferences. Either way, how would pilots go
about announcing whether or not they are armed? Imagine the
following hypothetical announcement:
Good afternoon. This is your captain speaking, with just a little
flight information. Coming up on your left, we're going to be
catching a glimpse of the Grand Canyon, and on the right you'll
be able to see the Hoover Dam in just a few minutes. We're fly-
ing at an altitude of 37,000 feet and our airspeed is 400 miles an
hour. Couple little facts here. I'm packing a Colt King Cobra.
That's a .357-caliber firearm with a black rubber grip and a six-
inch barrel. Also, the co-pilot is carrying-a [Berretta] custom de-
fense pistol with all the bells and whistles you'd expect from a
custom gun of that kind, with an alloy frame and bevel treatment
on the entire gun. Our chief flight attendant Roger, has a Ruger
Bearcat, a .22 with a hand-fluted cylinder. All three capable of
piercing body armor at a distance of up to 27 feet and can put a
hole in human bone and flesh the size of the Grand Canyon
which, by the way, is coming up on the left hand side of the
plane, so just sit back and relax and enjoy the rest of the flight. 1 9
This announcement may seem a little extreme, but it highlights
the problem of passenger notification that all airlines will even-
tually face.
If airlines choose to inform passengers, they will have to de-
cide how much information to release and in what form. For
example, will merely the general guidelines and requirements of
the federal flight deck officer-training program be posted for
the public or will more specific information such as pilots' indi-
vidual test scores or firing statistics be provided? Will notice of
training include background information such as marital arts,
pertinent skills, or prior military experience? Knowing the de-
tails may undermine the public's confidence in their pilots and
the program if training standards or pilot performance is lower
than expected. However, keeping the public in the dark may
raise suspicion and foster doubts as well. In addition to content,
airlines will also have to decide how accessible the information
they do provide will be. They could provide notice through in-
158 See supra note 58.
159 Id.
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direct sources like the Internet or passenger hotlines or more
directly and conveniently through posted signs in the airport,
on airplanes, or even in leaflets in each passenger's seat pocket.
It will be challenging for airlines to balance passenger interests
with the costs of providing information as well as issues of confi-
dentiality, safety, and consumer confidence.
IX. CONCLUSION
When viewed through the lenses of safety, strategy, econom-
ics, liability, policy, and ethics, the legislative mandate to arm
pilots clearly emerges as too unpredictable, too dangerous, and
too costly to be worthwhile or operative. The only value it has is
based in emotion, but Americans must be careful to not allow
the emotionalism of tragedy to trump the greater power of intel-
lect in pursuit of a comprehensive and long-range plan of de-
fense. Given the logistical, diplomatic, economic, and
informational obstacles that the United States faces in defeating
not only Al Qaeda, but terrorism in general, arming pilots would
be an imprudent misuse of human capital and financial re-
sources. Besides the budgetary expense, the devastating impact
it will have on personal lives, national morale, and homeland
defense if proven unsuccessful could cost America the war on
terrorism.
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